

## Mapping and Measuring the Impact of Anti-Corruption Agencies: A New Dataset for 18 Countries

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**Abstract:** Based on the enormous success cases of Singapore and Hong Kong, numerous countries in recent years have adopted their own Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACA's) in order to help combat corruption. However, there are significant variations in such aspects as the design, scope, budget and autonomy, of these relatively new government agencies. Most previous accounts of ASA's have focused on single cases or secondary sources as means of comparing two or more ASA's. This article presents novel survey-data with first hand data from agency heads themselves on variations in 18 relatively new ACA's, mainly focused in Eastern and Central Europe, yet with additional examples in Africa, Latin America and South East Asia, which can now be accessed by researchers of corruption and bureaucratic studies among other topics. Additionally, the article reports preliminary correlations and simple regressions using the new dataset with corruption indicators.

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## **Introduction**

The determinants of corruption have been under serious scholarly inquiry during the past decade. Focusing on political institutions and the impact of constitutions (Persson and Tabellini), cultural heritage (La Porta 1999) ethnic or linguistic fractionalization (Charron) or trust in government and social capital (Rothstein) among others, scholars have produced many interesting and fruitful insights into the general causes of what the World Bank calls (one of the most serious problems of our time... find this).

However, missing in the empirical literature of this long list of determinants are systematic variables on the specific nature of the bureaucracy – whether independent anti-corruption agencies exists and how they are designed. This study reports novel survey data on one of the fastest spreading new actors in the realm of the fight against corruption – anti-corruption agencies (ASA's). Based on the numerous case studies in the literature on Singapore and Hong Kong, which demonstrate the positive impact of such an agency on curbing corruption, studying the effect, scope and independence of newly founded agencies outside of Southeast Asia should be a fruitful path for scholars to take in the road to better understanding the fight to combat corruption.

More and more, ACAs, such as corruption prevention bureaus, autonomous anti-corruption commissions and investigation commissions are being designed and adopted as critical instruments for combating corruption. Oftentimes, ASA's are created when “corruption has spread so widely and the police are so corrupt that offences of bribery are no longer investigated or prosecuted” (de Speville 2008: 1).

In particular, developing states have been under significant international pressure to curb domestic corruption from such international organizations (IO's) as the United Nations (UN), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU). States that are geographically located within the official boundaries of Europe have been especially prone to this pressure, partially having to do with their ambitions to join the EU (Dionisie and Checchi 2008), with the vast majority of those in Central and Eastern Europe having ASA already in place since the mid-to-late 1990's. In the advent of new political actors in the fight to curb corruption it is incumbent upon scholars to find ways to evaluate and study such agencies' effectiveness. Yet what do these agencies look like and what is their real legal power in terms of preventing and prosecuting corruptive behaviour? Due to a lack of comparable data, cross-national studies and evaluations of the effective of ASA's have been difficult to say the least. This new data reported in this analysis offers scholars the opportunities to compare and contrast cross-country differences among states with ASA's along with giving scholars additional resources to undergo individual case studies on a particular anti-corruption agency.

ASA's have been notably effective in curbing corruption in the past, yet their impact on combating domestic corruption has certainly been known to be negligible at times as well (de Speville 2008; Heilbrunn 2004; Doig et al 2006; Meagher 2004). What are some the factors that account for the variations in levels of corruption outcomes? In short – why do some ASA's work while others simply do not? This analysis supplies researchers focusing on such questions as these valuable data and background insights into these new actors in the anti-corruption dynamic.

The study is set up as follows. The first section defines what is meant by an anti-corruption agency, and establishes a working definition according to specifically stated criteria. The second section presents a background of the international anti-corruption movement, briefly reviews the current literature on them and underscores where the study of such agencies is salient and fruitful for future research. The third section provides details about the survey that was used to acquire the data on the ASA's in the study, a breakdown of specific components in the anti-corruption agency index (*ACA Index*), along with the sample of countries in the dataset. The next section uses the data and demonstrates some preliminary empirical findings which attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of the ASA's in their short-term impact on fighting corruption. The final section offers future research question and directions in which scholars could potentially take this data along with additional ways to evaluate the impact of ASA's.

### **What is an Anti-Corruption Agency?**

According to de Sousa (2006: 12), the operational definition of an ACA is:

*“...publically funded bodies of a durable nature whose specific mission is to fight corruption and associated crimes and to reduce the opportunity structures favourable to its occurrence through preventive and repressive strategies.”*

Broadly, Doig et al (2007: 252) pointed out that ASA's have one or more of three common features.

- 1) *Investigation and enforcement duties.* Independent investigative power is a common role among the vast majority of ACAs and undeniably an essential one for maintaining the credibility of the body's assessments and findings of corruption in a society.
- 2) *Corruption prevention responsibilities.* Most scholars agree that ideally, prevention is the most salient function of an anti-corruption agency. Most ACAs offer advice on macro and micro strategies for averting corruption via corruption prevention departments. Furthermore, education and training provide evidence that knowledge about corruptive behavior before hand can aid in preventing the act (for example the Hong-Kong ICAC). Such capacities include workshops on anti-corruption and consultative and assistance aid to public and private sector employees.
- 3) *Public awareness and responsibility to educate on matters of corruption.* In addition to prevention and investigation, certain agencies undertake a broader role to conduct research and monitor and promote reform in the public service and/or the criminal justice system generally. Clearly defining what is meant by corruption and disseminating such information to the public and private sector employees susceptible to corrupt behavior as well as the general public is a critical role for any ASA.

Although Hong Kong's *Independent Agency Against Corruption* (ICAC) contains all three features, others might have a more limited scope, containing only two or one of these characteristics. While actual ACA's vary considerably - in their make-up, funding,

staffing, domain of investigation, and to whom they are accountable, among other variations - there are necessary conditions for such an agency to be considered an ACA. Based on the contemporary literature on ACA's (Doig 1995; Quah 1999; Pope and Vogl 2000; De Speville 2000; Dionisie and Checchi 2007; de Sousa 2006), more specific criteria for what might constitute such an agency includes the following characteristics:

1. Distinct from other government agencies, with a single issue of preventing and controlling corruption
2. Are permanent in nature, not meant to serve as a 'temporary fix', but as a long term institution.
3. Are publically funded
4. Are accountable to at least one other government body - parliament, ministry of justice, the executive, etc.
5. Contain both preventative and repressive dimensions of corruption control.
6. Centralize information on domestic corruption which is disseminated to other actors – media, IO's, law enforcement, etc.
7. Mainly recognized by, and accessible to, the general public

Thus there is of course an implied degree of autonomy and independence that these agencies maintain from ministry of justice or standard law enforcement. There is also fiscal independence, in that they have their own independent budget which is publicly funded. The agency is intended to be impartial and expected to both research and take measures to prevent corruption as well as investigate corruption when it is suspected anywhere within the ACA's domain.

### **Recent Literature on ASA's**

ASA's have emerged in recent years in relative large numbers, particularly in developing countries and thus have drawn a significant amount of scholarly attention (Johnston 2000; Quah 1995 and 2001; Meagher 2002 and 2004; Heilbrunn 2004; Lengseth 2001; Doig, Watt and Williams 2006 and 2007; Robinson 1997; Williams and Doig 2000; Pope and Vogl 2000; de Sousa 2008; de Speville 2001 and 2008). Most of the literature remains focused on the institutional design of single cases (Quah 2001) or a small number of cases (Doig et al 2007; Dionisie and Checchi 2008; Heilbrunn 2004), generally discussing why or why not such ASA's have been effective. Others focus on various means of evaluating the performance and goals of ASA's (Meagher 2004; Doig et al 2006). Still other studies have concentrated on defining what institutional characteristics make ASA's distinct from other agencies in the bureaucracy and attempted initial ways to help scholars map out general institutional models of ASA's (Johnston 2000; OECD 2007; Heilbrunn 2004).

Although the two benchmarks of the anti-corruption agency, the *Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau* (CPIB) in Singapore and the *Independent Commission Against Corruption* (ICAC) in Hong Kong have received positive reviews in the corruption literature, some scholars warn that expectation of the efficacy of ASA's should be kept realistic (Doig et al 2006). This is primarily based on other ASA's, mainly in Africa and other developing regions, which have made many researchers skeptical about the effectiveness of such agencies and have drawn strong criticisms from scholars and policy-makers alike. In particular, most scholars agree that if corruption deeply embedded in a country than an ASA will not prove to be very effective. As Meagher (2002: 74) notes, "Most obviously, there is no way that ACAs can be effective in a

situation where essentially every important institution is compromised”. Along with this, several common criticisms can be found among the critics as to why ASA’s have failed, or might fail in the future, to curb corruption.

First and foremost is the idea that ASA’s must be politically independent both in law and in practice from the government and have the political will to carry out its mandate (de Speville 2008; de Sousa 2006; Heilbrunn 2004; Meagher 2004; Pope 1999). Such institutional protections for the appointment and removal of senior ASA heads and accountability to multiple government bodies and a strong degree of fiscal autonomy from oversight agencies are noted in the literature as critical for ASA’s to perform the role in the fight against corruption. For example, Meagher (2004: 94) argues that a primary reason as to why the African ASA’s (with the exception of Botswana) in his study have remained ineffective is due to “no structural independence or only partial autonomy” from the governments that established them. Conversely, Quah (2001: 35) notes that the CPIB in Singapore has succeeded due in part to its strong bureaucratic autonomy, in particular from law enforcement.

Secondly, the literature points to the idea of public accountability of ASA’s. This idea is twofold. First, a critical part of their success (or failure) is the involvement of the public. Everyday citizen complaints and oversight of abuses of corruption provide the agencies salient information they can then use to potentially investigate crimes. Yet as de Speville points out, the ASA’s must also be accountable to the public via legislative and/or executive oversight so as not to breed suspicion that the agency itself might be abusing its power (de Speville 2008: 5). Quah (1995) finds that on this point, Hong Kong’s ICAC and the CPIB have been effective because of the strong government oversight of the

agency itself so as to prevent ASA members from becoming corruptible while giving the agency a sense of legitimacy with the public. Citing the strong public oversight in the case of Ecuador's Comisión de Control Cívico de la Corrupción (CCCC), Meagher (2004: 93) argues that strong linkages to oversight and accountability can "go some way towards counteracting weakness in other areas" that the ASA might suffer from. A strong connection to civil society and established citizen organizations is also helpful (Camerer 2001).

Other reasons scholars cite for lack of ASA effectiveness (or success) include: compliance with a comprehensive national anti-corruption strategy – which include clear definitions of corruption and enforcement provisions, adequate funding and qualified staffing (yet some argue the staff should not be too large, *see Quah 2001*), strong codes of ethics within the organization itself, and as de Speville notes consistently (2001 and 2008), the government must have the honest political will to fight corruption.

This study takes seriously the numerous established pre-requisites for ASA success and attempts to employ and build on them here to compliment and add to the existing literature in two critical ways. As noted, the literature tends to focus on evaluations of specific cases, with information on such cases based mainly on secondary sources, with few exceptions<sup>1</sup>. We use Meagher's (2002) study and the many previous studies on ASA's as a critical template for the original survey data presented here. First and foremost, we have acquired insightful information on recent ASA's by going directly to the top source – the agency director. We feel such data is extremely reliable comparable

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<sup>1</sup> The most comprehensive report on multiple ASA's and their specific institutional configurations with respect to independence, budgeting resources and legal powers is a World Bank paper by Patrick Meagher (2002), in which he codes cross-national data on 14 ASA's. The comparative data provided by Meagher (2002) is on: Argentina, Botswana, Ecuador, France, Hong Kong, India, Singapore, Thailand, Uganda, Malaysia, Tanzania, Philippines and the United States

data for scholars to have access to. Secondly, while many in the literature have focused small case studies on African or Asian ASA's, we present data on each of the newly established agencies in Central and Eastern Europe, significantly expanding the number of countries now available for scholars to analyze.

### **International Pressure for ASA's: The 'Anti-Corruption Movement'**

Pressures from influential actors can influence domestic politics significantly. This reigns true for the majority of states in our sample, which lie in Central and Eastern Europe and have been particularly influenced by the recent international movement to fight corruption, in particular from the European Union (Dionisie and Checchi 2008). In general, the recent rise of the "anti-corruption movement" has motivated a change in priorities in existing international actors and a series of new domestic actors to help curb corruption and improve governance. For example, beginning with the OECD in 1994, discussions on bribery came to the forefront by 1996, when a binding convention on "Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions" was signed by all 36 OECD member states (Sandholz and Gray 2003). The World Bank (WB) followed suit with a clear message about fighting corruption and began working the non-governmental organization (NGO) *Transparency International* in 1997 on combating such practices, along with establishing its own anticorruption institution the *World Bank Institute* (WBI), which together take on a number of corruption related problems.

In addition to the major global IO's, a number of regional IO's have followed suit in the anti-corruption theme as well. In particular, the European Union adopted a

comprehensive *Union Policy against Corruption* in 1997. This made all bribery illegal within the union and calls for attention to corruption practices with all states outside of the EU with any agreement with member states (Sandholz and Gray 2003). Additionally, the *Inter-American Convention against Corruption* from the Organization of American States (OAS Convention) came into existence in 1997 with a mandate to strengthen the development of mechanisms needed to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption. (United Nations Report 2003). Such IO's have argued strongly that the creation of a strong, independent ACA is a crucial instrument in the strategy on curbing corruption.

Thus spurred on by pressures from IO's and demands to reduce corruption by their own citizenry, many states formed an Anti-Corruption Agency, mainly in the last five to ten years. The Hong Kong ICAC, one of the most successful in history, of course served as a model for other ACA's world-wide (Johnston 1999; Quah 1999). Although beginning mainly in Asia, these agencies have spread into many regions in both the developing and developed world, particularly in the wake of the end of the Cold War in Eastern and Central Europe. Below in Table 1 is a distribution of ASA's in Europe (EU member states in italics).

\*\*\**Table 1 About Here*\*\*\*

What is indeed interesting to scholars and policy-makers in the field of corruption and good governance in the wake of this new actor is the variation of each ACA's respective investigative and prosecution powers, information gathering, resources, recruitment, and to whom the head of the agency is accountable. Such variations should

be interesting to scholars of bureaucratic effectiveness and the inner workings of agencies relative to the government.

Yet their similarities should also make this new actor interesting for researchers to investigate. ACA's are single-issue organizations, thus their effect (or lack thereof) cannot be confused by multiple goals or mandates. Their sole mission is to prevent, discover and aid in prosecuting corruption. They are intended to bring in 'fresh-thinking' and help overcome outdated methods of corruption detection and prevention that exists in conventional law enforcement. In principle, their staffs have extensive knowledge and training and can serve as vital information resources to the government, law agencies and the public at large.

As effective as such agencies are intended to become, it is incumbent on researchers to come up with creative ways to evaluate their performance. This new data and ASA index are designed to do just that. For scholars interested in cross-sectional studies, the ASA index offers many interesting possible comparisons. Additionally, for those scholars interested in case study research, the index can serve as a valuable tool for easily accessible information and historical background on each individual ASA.

### **Sample of Countries, Indicators and Survey Details**

Table 2 shows the distribution of ACA's in Europe – in both E.U. member states and for those that remain outside of the union. Of the 12 member states with ACA's in place, only two<sup>2</sup> - France and Belgium – are members of the E.U. 15. The other 10 states, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovak Republic, Malta,

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<sup>2</sup> Italy, which is also included in the sample, terminated its agency in 2006. The Berlusconi government is currently attempting to assemble a new commission to replace the previous ASA.

Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria, are newly accepted members from Eastern and Central Europe. Current candidate countries that have established ACA's include Croatia, Albania, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Moldova. An ASA is currently under consideration in Hungary and Turkey. The only current member from Eastern and Central Europe without an ACA in place – or plan for one in the near future - is Estonia. Additionally, the sample of countries in the ASA dataset contains Argentina, Australia, Malawi and Singapore for a total of 16 ASA agencies.

\*\*\*\**Table 2 about Here*\*\*\*\*

While Europe is certainly not alone in having established anti-corruption agencies, the prospects of EU accession has certainly brought about a significant new number of such institutions to the region in recent years, such that ASA's are now more concentrated in Eastern and Central European countries than any other region in the world. It is clear that the anti-corruption strategy issued by the UN, IMF and in particular by the European Union has had a strong influence over policy-makers in the region to adopt strategies, such as anti-corruption agencies, to hinder problems associated with corruption in their countries. However, as shown in Table 3, the scope, contacts with IO's, independence, powers and to which government body these ASA's are accountable vary significantly from country to country. Included with these sample questions in the survey were the directors' opinions regarding the primary rationale for the ASA (*raison d'être*), the primary focus or target (whether corruption in the bureaucracy, law enforcement, national or local politics, private sector or armed forces) and the type of recruitment used for staffing. The survey questions, which were all answered by

respective heads and directors of the ASA's themselves or their official representatives<sup>3</sup>. We have divided them into five thematic sections. Moreover, an index of 'institutional strength' has been created in order for researchers to better use the data for cross-country, comparative purposes. However, it is of course up to the individual researcher and the research question at hand if the aggregated index or individual indicators are most appropriate for future studies on ASA's.

\*\*\* *Table 3 about Here* \*\*\*

Table 4 demonstrates a breakdown of the data according to the five different categories in the survey in Table 3. Clearly there is a good deal of variation among each indicator as well as the final index itself. The indicator which demonstrates the most variation among the ASA's in the sample is the *legal mandate of the agency*. Here, through the survey, we were able to find out specifically the level to which ASA's can investigate and prosecute corruption charges as well as if the ASA director felt as if that mandate was sufficient to deal with the problems they were faced with. Additionally, this section deals with the extent to which the proper checks and balances are in place for the agency to be able to carry out the legal powers it is given. The overall ASA Index has a mean score of 2.85 out of a total 5 points (higher scores representing stronger ASA's), with a minimum of 1.58 (Malta) and a high score of 3.65 (Singapore). A cross-country visual aid of the comparative scores of the ASA index is shown in Figure 1.

\*\*\* *Table 4 about Here* \*\*\*

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<sup>3</sup> In May, 2006, each of the ASA directors or their respective representatives were invited by *Centro de Investigação Estudos de Sociologia* (CIES) to an international workshop - "European Anti-Corruption Agencies: Protecting the Community's Financial Interests in a Knowledge- Based, Innovative and Integrated Manner" in Lisbon, Portugal. It was there that the initial respondents took the time to answer 65 questions on the various features of the ASA that they represent. A sample of the survey questions is listed in table 3.

\*\*\*Figure 1 about Here\*\*\*

### **Means of ASA Evaluation**

With many new ASA's in existence – some effective and others simply 'window-dressing' - intended to provide corrupt leaders with a few years of political cover, how might we discover *why* some agencies are more effective than others? As Meagher writes, "the record of ASA's has received insufficient scrutiny, and what discussion there has been generally lacks rigor" (Meagher 2005: 77). Thus a serious problem in this literature that this study intends to address is the lack of any generalizable means with which scholars can evaluate the performance of ASA's. The amalgamated survey data compiled here intends to provide scholars with ways to compare and contrast institutional variations among these relatively new actors in the anti-corruption fight. Such a design provides policy-makers and scholars the insights to make appropriate recommendations for either new ASA's in countries without one, or improvements upon existing ASA's.

Following a simple example from economics literature and influential political science scholarship on corruption, the primary purpose of an ASA is to aid in overcoming what is known as the *principle-agent* problem (Rose-Ackerman 1977; Klitgaard 1988). In this dilemma, elected government officials act as the agent serving the public, in this case the principle. Ideally, bureaucrats in the public administration, who are working on behalf of public officials and thus ultimately on behalf of the public, are motivated to serve the interests of the principle. Yet with asymmetrical information, the agents can take advantage of the principle (via corruption) if little oversight is provided or enforced. Anti-corruption agencies, along with the media and other separate actors supposedly

monitoring and enforcing government officials, attempt to balance out information asymmetries by providing the public (directly or indirectly) valuable information about the way in which bureaucrats or elected officials are behaving. Ultimately, an actor such as an ASA realigns incentives in favour of the citizens by acting as either a deterrent to public sector corruption (officials fear information of their corrupt behaviour will become public), or as an enforcer of the rule of law if they detect and discover examples of corruption.

Thus the overall expectation of the ASA is, through additional information and enforcement, to improve the performance of government by reducing corruption. Based on these expectations, we can then make hypotheses regarding what characteristics an ASA might contain for it to be successful in actually fighting corruption. It must have viable detection or enforcement methods, be adequately staffed and funded, be independent from the political actors that they are supposed to oversee, accessible to citizens, and linked with other international and domestic agencies with similar mandates so as to best share information. It is detailed information on these broad categories that the survey data on these 18 ASA provides to researchers.

However, before simply comparing the ASA's across space, one must consider the potential limitations of such agencies. Among such limitations could be political stability, impartial rule of law, relatively stable economic environment, a lack of de jure autonomy, and a free media to serve as conduit through which the public receives information on corrupt actions. Such structural conditions must be considered and controlled for when comparing ASA's cross-nationally.

## Examples of its Uses

Though the uses of the dataset can be for scholars looking to provide readers with valuable background information in an in-depth case study, the survey data can also be used for cross-national comparisons. Questions such as – what common institutional features (size, mandate, budget, independence, recruitment, etc.) do successful ASA’s share? Under what domestic conditions are certain types of ASA’s created? The list goes on. Of course many scholars and practitioners will be interested in whether these ASA’s have any effect on the level of corruption in a country that has chosen to adopt them. Moreover, what types of ASA’s, institutionally speak, have a better chance of succeeding in their mandate? I take a first step in providing those interested in some of these questions by using three standard indicators of corruption, from *Transparency International*, *International Country Risk Guide* and *the World Bank*. In a very basic, and admittedly crude analysis, I take the average corruption score for each country for the two years prior to the first year the ASA was officially put into place. I then look at both the short term and long term effects of the ASA’s by taking the score of the following year as well as the most recent year in the data for each of the cases in the sample where available. Obviously a couple of caveats are needed in interpreting results such as these. The first is that these are bivariate analyses with no control variables. The ASA is the only variable assumed to have any effect on a change in the corruption indicator. Secondly, both the ASA index and the corruption indicators are based largely on subjective, survey-data information. Neither are entirely ‘hard measures’ and thus must be interpreted carefully. Baring these cautions in mind, Table 5 reports some of the initial comparative results.

*\*\*\*Table 5 about here\*\*\**

The data show the pre-ASA level of corruption as well as the possible immediate impact and the longer term impact of the agency. Bold numbers indicate that there has been an improvement in the corruption scores<sup>4</sup>. It seems the short term impacts of the creation of the agencies have a consistent impact. With the exception of Italy, Moldavia and Macedonia, the rest of the countries in the samples experienced an improvement in perceived corruption in the short term. This would appear to imply that the very weakest agencies, according to the ASA index, actually might exacerbate the situation somehow and with little power to investigate or enforce laws, they might simply cause an increase in confusion among law enforcement. With respect to the longer term, there are less states that show this type of improvement than in the short run. Many of the states, including Argentina, Malawi, Czech republic and France, experienced the short-term gain of the ASA, yet in the final year in the respective data indicator, they had in fact a lower perceived corruption score than before the ASA was enacted. Others such as Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania seemed to improve both in the short and long run after the ASA was established. Interestingly, each of ASA's above the mean score (2.85) of the ASA index report both short and long run reductions in corruption perception (exception is Malawi in the long run) while the states below the mean show some positive short term gains while none of them demonstrated long term reductions in corruption perception. This could be the first step in showing empirically that stronger ASA's (with respect to autonomy, enforcement, transparency, inter-agency cooperation and prevention) perform better than weaker ones. Obviously, more rigorous empirical analyses should be

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<sup>4</sup> Transparency International is scored from 0-10, ICRG from 0-1 and World Bank data from -2.5 to 2.5. For all three indicators, higher scores indicate less perceived corruption.

performed in the future, yet these shown here are simply intended to be a first step in looking at some important questions pertaining to the impact of ASA's. Table 6 shows a summary list of the results.

## **Conclusion**

This analysis has focused on one of the newest actors in the fight against corruption – the anti-corruption agency. Though ASA's are highly criticized in the literature and there are many strengths and weaknesses to them in general, I argue that it is essential to move beyond the idea of case studies and anecdotal evidence in evaluating ASA's. To do this, this study provides the field some valuable new, first hand survey data on 18 ASA from the agency directors themselves in order to be able to map them out along a number of different line for scholars to compare and contrast them in future studies. I take the survey data, and based on a number of different questions in five general areas of evaluation, I create an ASA Index for scholars to use for comparative studies. Of course the index can be used for deeper cases studies as there is novel information about each agency reported in the surveys. Additionally, some empirical evidence shown here suggests that ASA's which have institutionally stronger aspects yield not only positive short term but long term gains in battling corruption. Those performing worse on the ASA index demonstrate no long term gains and little gains in the short term. The variation of the results gives credence to the many scholars who have been critical of ineffective ASA's, however, this analysis shows *some* reasons for optimism of these agencies if they are well-designed, giving them adequate autonomy, accountability enforcement, preventive, information tools and transparency.

**Table 1: The Distribution of ASA's in the European Area**

	<i>Established ASA</i>	<i>Have No Established ASA</i>	<i>Unidentified Countries</i>	<i>ASA Under Consideration</i>
<b>EU Member States</b>	Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Rep., France, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovak Rep., Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania	Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Netherlands, U.K.	Austria, Denmark	Hungary
<b>Candidate Countries and other European States</b>	Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo	-	-	Turkey

**Table 2: List of States in the Survey**

<u>Country</u>	<u>Start Year</u>
1. Argentina	1999
2. Australia	1988
3. Croatia	2001
4. Czech Rep. (1)	1991
5. Czech Rep. (2)	1992
6. France	1993
7. Latvia	2002
8. Lithuania	1997
9. Malawi	1998
10. Malta	1988
11. Moldova	2002
12. Macedonia	2002
13. Montenegro	2000
14. Romania	2002
15. Slovakia	2004
16. Kosovo	2007
17. Singapore	1952
18. Italy (until 2006)	2004

**Table 3: Sample of Survey Questions**

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*Part 1: Questions of Accountability*

- Is the ASA Agency
- 1 Audited?
  - 2 Protected from political interference? (De facto)
  - 3 Protected from political interference? (De Jure)
  - 4 Term limit for ASA Head?
  - 5 Max. tenure of ASA Head (years, if term limits=1)
  - 6 Head of ASA protected from removal without due justification?
  - 7 To which body is the ASA responsible? (1=the government, executive; 2=the parliament; 3=justice ministry; 4=finance ministry; 5=multiple bodies)
  - 8 Is the ASA head directly responsible to the same body that appointed him/her?

*Part 2: Level of International Cooperation and Coordination*

- 1 Has the ASA been solicited for information on a domestic case to provide international cooperation?
- 2 Is the ASA part of any international network of anti-corruption agencies?
- 3 Is the ASA a member of any IGO?

*Part 3: Handling Citizen Complaints and Charges*

- Are anonymous complaints taken into
- 1 consideration?
  - 2 Can citizens complain without fear of recrimination? (de facto)
  - 3 Does ASA denounce/ report unfounded charges to the proper channels?
  - 4 Total number of complaint outlets for citizens? (out of a total of 5)

*Part 4: Staffing and Financing*

- 1 How is the Head office staff, including the director, recruited?
- 2 How is the general administrative staff recruited?
- 3 What is the total number of employees in the body?
- 4 What is the annual budget (2006)?


*Part 5: Legal mandate of the agency*

- 1 In Law, what is the level of investigation and inquiry power given to the agency? (0-11)
  - 2 What is the power of the agency to prosecute suspected corruption cases? (0-4)
  - 3 Does the agency have sufficient special powers to carry out its mandate?
  - 4 Are there sufficient checks and balances in place to ensure the agency special investigative powers?
  - 5 Are the results of the agency reported directly to the public?
  - 6 Does the agency have a national/federal or regional/provincial level jurisdiction (1= national; 0=regional)
  - 7 With respect to the type of corruption, what is the top priority of the agency? (1=armed forces, 2= police forces, 3= pub. Admin., 4=judiciary, 5=private sector, 6=multiple)
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**Table 4 - Summary Statistics**

Variable	Obs	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
<i>AI Total</i>	18	.629	.210	.167	.833
<i>IC Total</i>	18	.537	.283	0	1
<i>CC Total</i>	18	.631	.224	.25	1
<i>SF Total</i>	18	.583	.274	0	1
<i>MN Total</i>	18	.472	.234	.105	.789
<i>ASA Index</i>	18	2.85	.592	1.58	3.65

**Figure 1**



**Table 5 - Initial Analysis: Pre and Post ASA  
Corruption Indicators**

	<i>Transparency Int'l</i>		
	Pre	Post t+1	End Year
<i>Argentina</i>	3.11	<b>3.5</b>	2.9
<i>Croatia</i>	3.25	<b>3.8</b>	<b>3.4</b>
<i>Latvia</i>	3.4	<b>3.8</b>	<b>4.7</b>
<i>Moldova</i>	2.85	2.4	2.67
<i>Romania</i>	2.85	2.8	<b>3.1</b>
<i>Italy</i>	5.35	4.9	n/a
	<i>ICRG</i>		
	Pre	Post t+1	End Year
<i>Argentina</i>	.601	<b>.695</b>	.467
<i>Croatia</i>	.619	<b>.694</b>	<b>.694</b>
<i>Czech Rep.</i>	.782	<b>.787</b>	.666
<i>France</i>	.963	<b>.987</b>	.667
<i>Malawi</i>	.485	<b>.555</b>	.444
<i>Moldova</i>	.552	.527	n/a
	<i>World Bank</i>		
	Pre	Post t+1	End Year
<i>Lithuania</i>	.123n	<b>.011</b>	<b>.362</b>
<i>Macedonia</i>	-.523n	-.725	n/a
<i>Romania</i>	-.501	<b>-.287</b>	<b>-.225</b>
<i>Slovakia</i>	.303	<b>.432</b>	n/a
<i>Italy</i>	.765	.408	n/a

**Table 6 - Summary of Results**

<i>Rank of Countries by ASA Index</i>			Potential effect of ASA	
			<i>Short term</i>	<i>Long term</i>
1	Singapore	3.64		<i>positive<sup>a</sup></i>
2	Latvia	3.53	positive	positive
3	Cz. Rep.1	3.47		
4	Australia	3.33		
5	Malawi	3.30	positive	negative
6	Croatia	3.27	positive	positive
7	Romania	3.09	positive	positive
8	Slovakia	3.08	positive	n/a
9	Kosovo	2.89		
10	Lithuania	2.86	positive	positive
11	Cz. Rep.2	2.83	positive	negative
12	Argentina	2.81	positive	negative
13	Montenegro	2.67		
14	France	2.63	positive	negative
15	Macedonia	2.62	negative	n/a
16	Moldova	1.87	negative	negative
17	Italy	1.82	negative	n/a
18	Malta	1.58		

<sup>a</sup>based on all accounts of the level of corruption in Singapore prior to the ASA

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